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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Right to know. No person shall be deprived of 
the right to examine documents or to observe the 
deliberations of all public bodies or agencies 
of State government and its subdivisions, except 
in cases in which the demand of individual 
privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public 
disclosure. Constitution of the State of 
Montana. Article II, Section 9 (1972).
As one advocate of "right to know" provisions argues,
"[s]ecrecy in government menaces democracy and sets a
pattern that follows the political philosophy of a
totalitarian state."1 Public knowledge of government is
essential to the democratic process. Freedom of
information is the basis for many other freedoms: freedom
of opinion, freedom of assembly, freedom from secret
trials, freedom of choice, freedom to protect against
discriminating practices —  freedoms largely commensurate
with the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the United
States. A threat to the right to know is a threat to many
of our most treasured freedoms.
Secrecy in government was brought to America by the
original colonists. In England, parliamentary debates were
1 Frank Thayer, Legal Control of the Press (Brooklyn: 
Foundation Press, 1962), p. 164.
1
first closed to the public on the theory that secrecy 
protected against interference by the Crown and later, 
debates were closed in order to conceal the member's 
statements and votes from constituents.2 Although common 
law recognized the right of the public to inspect 
government-held documents, the right to observe 
deliberations of governmental bodies did not exist and 
publication of the proceedings of governmental bodies was 
prohibited.3
The founding fathers of the United States also 
maintained secrecy. In 1776 the names of the signers of 
the Declaration of Independence were withheld for six 
months due to a fear of prosecution for treason4 and both 
the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention 
proceedings were held in secret or closed sessions.5
The founding fathers were divided in their support 
for the necessity of secrecy in governmental affairs. 
Thomas Jefferson cautioned against the secrecy of the 
Constitutional Convention in a letter to John Adams, 
written during the summer of 1787: "I am sorry they began
2Harold L. Cross, The People's Right to Know 
(Morningside Heights, New York: Columbia University Press,
1953) 180.
3Frank Thayer, Legal Control of the Press. 164.
4Ibid.
5Closed sessions were continued in the House of 
Representatives until 1794 and in the Senate until 1812. Ibid.
their deliberations by so abominable a precedent as that of 
tying up the tongues of their members. Nothing can justify 
this example but the innocence of their intentions, and 
ignorance of the value of public discussions."6 Advocates 
of the "right to know" suggest that the framers of the 
Constitution recognized the existence of such a right and 
were strongly influenced by it in writing the original 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This conclusion is 
based upon the fact that the language of the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights provided for minimal government and 
retention of rights by the people.7
Others claim that the founding fathers looked upon 
this right as a conditional right; that the right of the 
people to know would not be violated if government 
maintained secrecy in some matters. They suggest that it 
was assumed that "the people agreed it should not know what 
could not be told it without damage to the public 
interest.1,8
6David Obrien, "The First Amendment and the Public's 
'Right to Know,'" Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. 7, 
no.3 (Spring 1980), 592 (quoting from The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson).
7Thomas J. Hennings, "Constitutional Law; The
People's Right to Know," American Bar Association Journal 
45 (July 1959), 668.
8Louis Henkin, "The Right to Know and the Duty to 
Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 120 (1971), 273.
The debates as to what or how much the people should 
know about the affairs of government continue today. 
Montana has given specific constitutional status to the 
public's right to know. However, this is not the case in 
any other state or the federal government.
This paper examines the basis for the right to know 
as founded in democratic theory and in legal theory. The 
emphasis is on the legal basis for the right to know in 
Montana and the impact of this right on public 
administrators. Since the right to know is not absolute 
and can be outweighed by an individual's right of privacy, 
difficulties arise for public administrators who are most 
often called upon to balance these rights.
To date the Montana Legislature has not defined 
guidelines regarding administrative compliance with the 
right to know. The decisions as to when to disclose 
information and when to withhold have been left primarily 
to administrative discretion resulting in controversial and 
arbitrary enforcement, a frustrated public, and a sometimes 
bewildered public administrator. This paper examines these 
problems and concludes with guidelines for administrative 
implementation of the "right to know."
CHAPTER II
DEMOCRATIC THEORY BASIS OF THE "RIGHT TO KNOW"
This chapter will explore and explicate the 
relationship between the "right to know" principle and 
democratic theory. Democracy as a concept encompasses many 
apparently disparate political structures and contradictory 
political values ranging from the "direct democracy" of the 
ancient Greek city states through the "constitutional 
democracy" of the United States and Canada and on to the 
so-called "people's democracy" as divined by Karl Marx and 
acted upon in Russia and China. The concern of this 
chapter is the constitutional democracy of the United 
States, the structural principles and values from which it 
emanates and to which it is committed. The thesis of this 
chapter is the essential nature of the "right to know" in 
a democracy which is founded upon the value of the 
individual, which seeks justice and truth, and which is 
committed to popular sovereignty, representative government 
and participatory politics.
The idea of the "right to know" stems from a 
substantive body of democratic theory. This democratic 
theory assumes an informed citizenry and acknowledges that
5
in principle the public has a "right to know."9 Both 
classical and contemporary theories of democracy not only 
require freedom of access to information, but also justify, 
as an inherent public right, demands for information about 
what government is doing and under what circumstances.10 
Alexis de Tocqueville in his study of democracies observed 
that " [w]hen the right of every citizen to a share in the 
government of society is acknowledged, everyone must be 
presumed to be able to choose between the various opinions 
of his contemporaries and to appreciate the different facts 
from which inferences may be drawn."11
The following sections present; first, a discussion 
of the literature which addresses the structural character 
of a democracy and second, a discussion of the normative 
character of a democracy, and the support given to the 
"right to know" concept by the structural and normative 
character of democracy.
9David O'Brien, "Privacy and the Right of Access: 
Purposes and Paradoxes of Information Control," 
Administrative Law Review 30 (1978) : 45-60.
10O'Brien, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. 579-
632.
11Alexis de Tocqueville, Alexis de Toccmeville on 
Democracy. Revolution and Society, eds. J. Stone and S. 
Mennell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 88.
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Structure of a Democracy 
The structural character of democracy consists 
primarily of three basic principles: popular sovereignty,
representation and participation. These three aspects 
demonstrate the necessity of an informed citizenry in order 
for the individual citizen to be able to function in a 
democratic society. Each principle has its own rationale 
for the necessity of making information about government 
available to the people.
Popular Sovereignty 
The idea of popular sovereignty in the context of 
constitutional democracy is the creation of government by 
the transfer of defined and limited power from the people 
to that government. According to Noah Webster, "All power 
is vested in the people. This is their natural and 
inalienable right."12 This idea leads to the concept that 
citizens in a democracy are the true rulers. According to 
John Locke, the individual is by nature free and enters 
into society as a matter of choice. The state thus may 
exercise authority over individuals only with their 
consent, a consent that they alone are capable of giving.13
12Noah Webster, "Plan for the Union of the American 
States," Old South Leaflets. Vol. VIII (Boston: Old South
Meeting House, 1896), 402.
13John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. 
Thomas P. Peardon (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational
Publishing, 1952), 54-55.
The specific political consequences following from this 
theory are that all power to make laws resides in the 
citizenry and it is only through delegation of that 
authority that the state may act.14 John Stuart Mill 
expressed agreement with this concept when he stated that 
"no government may govern without acceptance of its 
citizens."15
Thus, the process of self-government requires that 
although individuals must surrender some of their personal 
autonomy to the political authority, they do so voluntarily 
while maintaining the ultimate power to diminish or enlarge 
the authority granted to the government. In order for the 
people to function as the ultimate authority, making 
decisions regarding the power to be delegated and to whom 
it is to be assigned, freedom of access to information is 
essential. Accordingly in an 1820 letter, Thomas Jefferson 
wrote: "I know of no safe depository of the ultimate
powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we 
think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control 
with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it 
from them, but to inform their discretion."1  ̂ Madison,
14Ibid.. 81.
15John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative 
Government. ed. C. Shields (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1958), 6-9.
160'Brien, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. 587 
(quoting from Writings of Jefferson).
like Jefferson, believed that a "well-instructed people 
alone can be permanently a free people"17 and a free people 
must exist in order for a government based on popular 
sovereignty to prevail.
Representation 
Representation is the second principle of the 
structural character of democracy being considered. In a 
representative democracy the citizenry delegates to its 
representatives the responsibility of making and 
implementing governmental policy; however, as was explained 
above, the general authority remains with the people. 
These elected representatives are merely agents of the 
popular will and are held to be ultimately accountable to 
the people. The power to govern having been delegated, the 
process of democratic government is left largely in the 
hands of these representatives. If people are to be in a 
position to judge the conduct of their government, to hold 
their representatives accountable for what government does, 
to decide the merits of public policy; if, indeed, they are 
to preserve the capacity for sound judgment regarding their 
representatives, they must have facts before them. 
Information must be made available to citizens not only as 
the government, elected officials or other governmental 
agents, would like to have these facts viewed, but also as
17The Complete Madison, ed. S. Padover (New York: 
Harper, 1953), 341.
those who disagree with the government may desire to state 
these facts. And again, as with popular sovereignty, 
information must be complete and undistorted to make 
informed debate possible18 and to make the election process 
effective. Voters must, at a minimum, have full 
information as to the character of their representatives, 
their positions on political issues, and their past record 
of actions on these issues.
Further, the principle of majority rule requires that 
state decisions in a representative democracy must be based 
on the alternative preferred by the greatest number.19 In 
accordance with this the state must have a system to 
ascertain public opinion in order to fashion a public 
policy in accordance with that opinion. In Robert Dahl's 
work, attention is given to the fact that all citizens must 
be able to vote with each vote equally weighted; and there 
must be a means to ensure that the vote truly expresses 
voter p r e f e r e n c e . 2° This cannot be accomplished without a 
fully informed citizenry because a preferential decision 
cannot be made by each voter unless each individual citizen 
has adequate information regarding the issues and the 
candidates.
18Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law. 2d 
ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1988), 813-14.
19Locke, The Second Treatise on Government. 73-74.
20Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 64-70.
According to Alexander Meiklejohn, when free men are 
voting and thereby selecting those who will represent them, 
it is not enough that truth is known by someone else, by 
some scholar or administrator or legislator; every voter 
must have this 11 truth."21 He suggests that "democratic 
governance depends on the wisdom of the voters,"22 which 
can only be advanced by allowing each citizen to discover 
this "truth" by full disclosure of all available 
information. Self-government is possible only to the 
extent that the leaders of the state are responsible and 
responsive to the will of the people. But if the will of 
the people is to have validity, if the people are to 
function as a rational electorate, they must have adequate 
information. The election process is the means by which 
the people can control representative government, forcing 
the accountability of their representatives.
It is difficult to differentiate between the 
representational aspect of democracy and the participatory 
aspect of democracy in some instances. For example, 
voting, as previously discussed, is the means of 
controlling representational activity. However, it is also 
a significant part of public participation in the 
democratic political process.
2Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its 
Relationship to Self-Government (New York: Harper, 1948),
68-107.
22Ibid.
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Participation
A democratic government's claim to legitimacy further 
rests upon the informed consent of all its citizens23 and 
mutual agreement of the right to equal political 
participation.24 "The liberties of a people never were nor 
ever will be, secure, when the transactions of their rulers 
may be concealed from them....[T]o cover with a veil of 
secrecy the common routine of [governmental] business, is 
an abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man."25 
The right to be informed and the freedom to exchange 
information are essential to participation in government 
which is indeed the very foundation of democracy. In the 
words of James Madison, "Knowledge will forever govern 
ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors 
must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A 
popular government without popular information or the means 
of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy 
or perhaps both."26
23Locke, The Second Treatise of Government.
24John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).
25Hennings, American Bar Association Journal. 770
[quoting from Elliott's Debates, vol. 3 (1787), Patrick
Henry speaking during debates prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution].
26Writings of James Madison, ed. G. Hunt (New York: 
G.P. Putnam, 1910), 103.
One crucial means of citizen participation in 
government is freedom of expression which is an empty 
vessel without access to the information necessary for 
intelligent debate. Without intelligent debate, decision 
making is necessarily presumptive and irrational. If 
democracy is to work, the public must have all available 
information in order to instruct its servants, the 
government.
James Madison proposed that the "censorial power is
in the people over the government, and not in the
government over the people."27 No governmental body is so
infallible as to permit the substitution of its judgment
for that of each individual person in the determination of
issues of truth or falsity.28 John Stuart Mill summed up
the point in his essay, On Liberty:
...the opinion which it is attempting to 
suppress by authority may possibly be true.
Those who desire to suppress it, of course, 
deny its truth; but they are not infallible.
They have no authority to decide the question 
for all mankind, and exclude every other person 
from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing 
to an opinion, because they are sure that it is 
false, is to assume their certainty is the same 
thing as absolute certainty.... There is the 
greatest difference between presuming an 
opinion to be true, because with every 
opportunity for contesting it, it has not been 
refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose
27Mill, Considerations on Representative Government. 7 
(quoting James Madison).
28Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech: A
Treatise on the Theory of the First Amendment (New York:
Matthew Binder, 1984), 1-7.
of not permitting its refutation. Complete 
liberty of contradicting and disproving our 
opinion, is the very condition which justifies 
us in assuming its truth for purposes of 
action; and on no other terms can a being with 
human faculties have any rational assurance of 
being right.29
In a democracy it is the citizen's duty to criticize 
government as it is the official's duty to administer.30 
All evidence bearing on public decisions must be available 
to the community without any intervening "preselection" by 
the state on the basis of truth or falsity31 since 
restrictions on information leave the public with an 
incomplete, and probably inaccurate, perception of the 
social and political universe. Thus, these restrictions 
can undermine the search for truth and distort the process 
by which citizens make critical decisions.
Moreover, it is not just the search for political 
truth, but the search for all forms of "truth," which is to 
say the search for all aspects of knowledge and the 
formulation of enlightened opinion on all subjects, that is 
dependent upon open channels of communication. Unless one 
has access to the available data on a given subject, it is 
not possible to make an informed judgment as to which 
"facts" and which views deserve to be endorsed. As Wallace
29John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Chicago: Longmans,
Green & Co.), Ch. II.
30New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
31Stanley Ingber, "The Market Place of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth," Duke Law Journal (February 1980) : 20-35.
Parks observed, the denial of information at its source 
disarranges the functioning of our political institutions 
and processes and the distribution of power.32
Thus, each of the basic structures of democracy gives 
support to the concept of the "right to know." However, 
popular sovereignty, representative government and 
participatory government are not merely the working 
principles of democracy, they are reflections of its 
underlying values. This normative character of democracy 
which further supports the idea of the "right to know" is 
discussed in the following section.
32Wallace Parks, "The Open Government Principle: 
Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution," The 
George Washington Law Review vol. 26, no. 1 (October 1957), 
1-22.
16
Value of a Democracy 
The previous section has explained the importance of 
the "right to know" concept in terms of the ability of 
citizens to function in a democratic society; whereas, this 
section discusses the importance of the "right to know" in 
terms of the values of a democracy to each citizen in that 
society.
Individual Dignity 
A claimed primary value of a democracy arises from 
the popular sovereignty concept of retention of general 
authority by the citizens. This reservation of power 
underscores the ultimate respect accorded each individual 
in a democratic society, a sense of personal dignity for 
each citizen. In support of this primary value the "right 
to know" becomes essential; for without access to 
information, the sense of self as having authority is lost.
It is diminished in direct proportion to the inaccuracy and 
incompleteness of the information given. Withholding of 
information leads to a disempowerment of the people, and a 
subsequent devaluation of individual dignity.
In normative democratic theory, individual self- 
government in the form of equal political liberty has value 
for its contribution to the "moral quality of civil life" 
rather than only as a means to an end. Self-government 
itself enhances the individual's sense of self-worth and
stabilizes "just institutions."33 The effect of self- 
government, where equal political rights have their fair 
value, is to enhance the self-esteem and the sense of 
political competence of the average citizen.
Accordingly, the individual's awareness of self-worth 
developed in the smaller associations of the community is 
confirmed in the constitution of the whole society. Since 
each is expected to vote, each is expected to have 
political opinions. The time and thought that is devoted 
to forming personal views is not governed only by the 
likely material return of the individual's political 
influence. Rather this is an activity enjoyable in itself 
that leads to a larger conception of society and to the 
development of intellectual and moral faculties.
Consequently, as stated by Mill, each citizen is 
called upon to weigh the interests of others and to be 
guided by some conception of justice and the public good 
rather than by personal inclinations.34 Having to explain 
and justify these personal views to others, the individual 
must appeal to principles that others can accept. 
Moreover, Mill adds, this education to public spirit is 
necessary if citizens are to acquire an affirmative sense 
of political duty and obligation, that is, a sense of duty
33Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 233-234.
34Mill, Considerations on Representative Government. 
13-45.
that goes beyond the mere willingness to submit to law and 
government.35 Constitutional democracy cannot long survive 
without citizens who believe, not only in their government, 
but in themselves.
Quality of Decisions 
A second fundamental value of democracy is that it 
produces the best decisions for the common good. To the 
extent there is agreement with the idea that 
constitutional-representative-participatory democracy
produces "the best decisions," there is an unequivocal 
necessity for the "right to know."
A fully informed citizenry maximizes the likelihood 
that sound decisions will be reached. According to 
Jefferson, "government should by all means in their power 
deal out the material information to the public in order 
that it may be reflected back on themselves in various 
forms in which public ingenuity may throw it."36
If any governmental body, be it a legislative body, a 
censorship board, the police department or a court of law, 
decides that the public should not have access to some of 
the information on any given topic because the 
communication of such information will prove injurious in 
some manner, to that extent the public's ability to make an
35Ibid.
360'Brien, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. 587 
(quoting from Writings of Jefferson).
informed judgment on such topics is crippled by a 
distortion of the information before it,37 and once again, 
the principle of individual autonomy is devalued.
Much essential knowledge is in the hands of agencies 
and officials of government who can thwart the democratic 
process by keeping relevant material secret. Many public 
administrators as well as elected officials will be likely 
to assume the public is not qualified to make the best 
decisions and take it upon themselves to control 
information, thereby controlling decisions. Consequently, 
the uninformed or misinformed public becomes disenchanted 
with government and is indirectly disenfranchised. While 
the vote is not prohibited, it does, however, become 
meaningless. That is why the public's right to know is a 
vital element of any democratic system, and why the burden 
of proof for justifying the withholding of information 
should always be on the shoulders of the would-be 
withholder.
Hence, secrecy of governmental affairs in the guise 
of protection of the public good can never promote freedom 
or enhance the quality of life in a democratic society. In 
1783 Pelatiah Webster, recommending openness in 
governmental affairs, stated:
Truth loves light and is vindicated by it.
Wrong shrouds itself in darkness and is
supported by delusion. An honest, well-
37Nimmer, Freedom of Speech. 1-7.
20
qualified man loves light, can bear close 
examination and critical inquiry and is best 
pleased when he is most thoroughly understood: 
a man of corrupt design, or a fool of no 
design, hates close examination and critical 
inquiry; the knavery of the one and the 
ignorance of the other, are discovered by it, 
and they both usually grow uneasy, before the 
investigation is half done.38
This chapter has discussed the theoretical support 
for the "right to know" in a democracy from both a 
structural and a normative perspective. The following 
chapter discusses the "right to know" concept in more 
specific terms. The legal basis for this right on the 
federal government level is outlined, detailing the 
constitutional implications and the statutory provisions 
for the "right to know."
38Pelatiah Webster, "The Political Union of the United 
States," Old South Leaflets. Vol. VIII (Boston: Old South 
Meeting House, 1896), 198 (first published in Philadelphia 
in 1783).
CHAPTER III 
LEGAL BASIS OF THE "RIGHT TO KNOW"
The government of the United States was founded upon 
the principles of democratic theory discussed in the 
previous chapter. The legal system of this democracy is 
predicated upon a Constitution which describes the powers 
of governance that are to be entrusted to the Congress and 
the President. This chapter discusses the basis for the 
public's "right to know" as a concept found in this legal 
system. The discussion of the constitutional status of 
this "right" includes the constitutional provisions 
defining the power to withhold information entrusted to the 
Congress and the President as well as the constitutional 
provisions limiting those withholding powers. Finally, the 
statutory provisions providing for public access to 
government-held information are examined along with the 
statutory provisions that purport to give government the 
power to conceal.
21
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Constitutional Status of the “Right to Know11 
The U.S. Constitution does not include an explicit 
provision creating a "right to know". Nonetheless, there 
are’ constitutional provisions which imply a "right to 
know," thereby precipitating major disagreement among 
constitutional theorists. This section focuses on the 
constitutional status of the right to know, raising 
questions regarding the framers' intent, the explicit 
language of the Constitution and what rights might be 
legitimately implied.
The question is asked: If the framers of the
Constitution intended a "right to know," why is there no 
explicit provision for this right in the Constitution? 
Some have answered that the "right to know like many other 
fundamental rights, was taken so much for granted that it 
was deemed unnecessary to include it."39 Others claim that 
the lack of a specific provision proves there was no 
intent to include such a right.40 This particular debate 
is both interminable and unenlightening and will, 
therefore, not be discussed in detail in this paper.
There are several objections raised to giving the 
"right to know" the status of a constitutional right. One 
basic objection to a constitutional "right to know" comes 
from a narrow, "strict interpretivist" reading of the
39Hennings, American Bar Association Journal. 668.
400'Brien, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. 590.
Constitution. According to John Hart Ely, interpretivism 
requires that judges 11 confine themselves to enforcing norms 
that are stated or clearly implicit in the written 
Constitution."41 Judge Robert Bork, presenting a
straightforward interpretivist position, stated that "the 
judge must stick close to the text and the history, and 
their fair implications, and not construct new rights."42 
Under this view, since neither the text nor the history 
indicate a specified right of the public to know, this 
right cannot be given constitutional status. Although 
adherents to an interpretivist reading of the Constitution 
do not find the right to know to be a constitutional right, 
they do concede that it might appropriately be made a 
statutory right.
In response to the overall interpretivist denial of a 
constitutionally-based right to know, non-interpretivists 
claim there is ample precedent for the addition of 
unenumerated rights, citing as examples, the right of 
privacy and the right to travel.43 A non-interpretivist
41John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980) 1.
42Mary M. Cheh, "Judicial Supervision of Executive 
Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expression for Government
Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government 
Information," Cornell Law Review 69 (April 1984), 744
(quoting Bork).
43Rights have not only been read into but out of the 
Constitution as well. For example, notwithstanding the 
absolutist language of the First Amendment: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
such as William 0. Douglas counters the arguments of 
interpretivists by advocating that the concern should not 
be with the rights the framers intended citizens to have 
but with the rights citizens should have.44
Another objection to the concept of a constitutional 
right to know is based on the problem of defining it and, 
perhaps more importantly, confining it. As discussed in 
Chapter II, the right to know is partially grounded in the 
necessities of democracy. It was averred that a people 
holding the right and power to govern must have the 
information upon which to base wise decisions. However, an 
amorphous concept of the right to know, not carefully 
defined, could reach beyond information about the conduct 
of government and invade individual privacy; disrupt 
criminal investigations and threaten national security. If 
there is a constitutional right to know, it should be 
defined and applied it in a principled way, not with an 
absolutist view.
Some theorists, such as Ely, conclude that the 
legitimacy of the courts' constitutional protection of 
values which are not plainly derived from the text must lie
speech...," the Supreme Court has upheld rulings supporting 
the Espionage Act of 1917 [Schenck v. U.S.. 249 U.S. 47
(1919), Abrams v. U.S.. 250 U.S. 616 (1919)], the Smith Act 
f Dennis v. U.S.. 341 U.S. 494 (1951)], and the federal
obscenity laws fHamling v. U.S.. 418 U.S. 87 (1974)] which 
restrict free speech.
44Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 209 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
concurring opinion).
in the exercise of a court function compatible with 
representative democracy and appropriate to an institution 
that is insulated from the political process.45 Critics of 
this view are concerned about the standards by which the 
courts will determine what secrets must be kept secret and 
the effect this might have on document classifications by 
the executive branch, i.e., concern regarding the necessity 
for classifying documents "top secret" and therefore 
unavailable to the public in the "interest of national 
security." The danger in broadly defining national 
security is that citizens are deprived of information about 
their own government, making it difficult if not impossible 
to hold elected officials accountable for their actions. 
Advocates of the need for maximum secrecy in government 
most often use the talismanic terminology of national 
security as a justification for withholding information 
from the public. There needs to be a careful balancing of 
the public's interest in the free flow of information and 
the government's interest in preserving "national 
security."
This balancing should be done according to the 
constitutional provisions which specify under what 
conditions governmental agents may withhold information. 
These withholding provisions are discussed in the following 
section along with the constitutional provisions which
45Ely, Democracy and Distrust. 75.
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limit governmental withholding of information and which 
implicitly allow for the public's "right to know."
Constitutional Provisions 
The President and the Congress have been entrusted 
with powers of governance by the Constitution and the 
powers to withhold information are derived from these. 
Since the general availability of governmental information 
is the fundamental basis upon which popular sovereignty and 
the consent of the governed rest and is also essential to 
representative and participatory government, as discussed 
in the previous chapter; it can be reasonably assumed that 
only a limited power to withhold information can be derived 
from Articles I and II of the Constitution.46 There are 
obvious limitations placed on the powers delegated to the
46U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 5, cl. 3: "Each
House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from 
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may 
in their Judgment require Secrecy...."
U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18: "To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
U.S. Constitution, art. II, sec. 1, cl. 1: "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America...."
U.S. Constitution, art. II, sec. 1, cl. 8: "Before
he enter on the Execution of the Office, he shall take the 
following Oath or Affirmation: 'I do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of 
President of the United States, and will to the best of my 
Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of 
the United States.'"
President and to Congress in the Bill of Rights,47 
including limitations on the powers to withhold information 
from the public. These limitations are found in the 
first,48 fifth,49 ninth50 and fourteenth51 amendments.
First Amendment 
The first amendment is a restriction on the exercise 
of legislative power and, thereby, binds the Congress in 
making laws and the President in executing those laws. The 
Supreme Court has not held that the right to know is a 
constitutional right that places the government under a 
duty to disclose. Nonetheless, the Court has considered 
the first amendment to contain narrow aspects of the right 
to know, stating that "a major purpose of (the first
47Parks, The Georcre Washington Law Review. 7. (When 
the Bill of Rights was adopted, many were of the opinion 
that this was unnecessary since no power had been granted 
the President or the Congress to do what the first ten 
amendments forbade.)
48U.S. Constitution, amend. I: "Congress shall make
no law .. . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances."
49U.S. Constitution, amend. V: "No person shall be
.. . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law ....11
50U.S. Constitution, amend. IX: "The enumeration in
the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed 
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
51U .S . Constitution, amend. XIV: "...nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law...."
amendment) is to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs."52
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional 
right to gather information, as a corollary of the right of 
freedom of speech and press.53 The press, as an organized 
representative of the public, performs the critical 
democratic functions of gathering and publishing news. The 
guarantee of a free press is "not for the benefit of the 
press so much as for the benefit of all of us."54 Freedom 
of the press can have no meaning without access to 
information. This does not imply that the press has any 
special immunity from the application of general law, but 
that "[i]n the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave 
the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its 
essential role in our democracy .... The press was 
protected so that it could bare the secrets of government 
and inform the people."55
Constitutional scholars have long argued that the 
first amendment embodies a "right to know," guaranteeing a 
right of individuals to access information about 
governmental activities. The idea is that a central
52Mill v. Alabama. 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
53Branzburq v. Haves. 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1973).
54Time. Inc. v. Hill. 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1966).
55New York Times v. U.S.. 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
(Black, J. concurring).
purpose of the first amendment is to protect and sustain 
the process of representative democracy by maintaining an 
informed electorate. In this sense, the first amendment 
right to free speech is actually two rights: Freedom to
speak and freedom to hear; i.e., the right of an individual 
to communicate outwardly an opinion or point of view and 
the right to receive information which is essential to an 
individual's decisionmaking and a sense of control over 
self. The right to receive information makes the "right to 
know" imperative. Justice Brennan, in discussing the 
relationship between the first amendment and self- 
government, concluded that government has an obligation to 
safeguard the indispensible conditions of democracy, namely 
the opportunity for individuals to see, to understand, and 
to criticize the operations of government.56 If this 
argument were followed to its logical conclusion, it would 
go further than merely limiting the withholding power of 
governmental agencies, it would place a constitutional duty 
on the government to enhance communication and public 
discussion of public affairs.
The first amendment, however, embodies more than 
"individualistic values" of the right to speak and to hear. 
It includes the societal interest in maintaining the 
integrity of the political process and the ability of the
56William J. Brennan, "Address by Justice Brennan," 
Rutaers Law Review 32 (1979) 175-177.
public to assert meaningful control over governmental
a c t i o n s . Because the government is best able to provide
information concerning its own activities, the public has a
right of access to information within the government's
control in order to maintain and nourish the democratic
process.58 According to Justice Powell, "public debate
must not only be unfettered; it must also be informed.1,59
Most constitutional theorists view free speech as a
corollary to democratic theory. Alexander Meiklejohn, for
example, perceives freedom of speech as an outgrowth of the
American consensus that public issues shall be decided by
universal suffrage, arguing that:
(p)ublic discussion of public issues, together 
with the spreading of information and opinion 
bearing on those issues, must have a freedom 
unabridged by our agents. Though they govern 
us, we, in a deeper sense, govern them. Over 
our governing, they have no power. Over their 
governing we have sovereign power.60
Stressing the importance of this, the Supreme Court stated,
"speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government.1,61
57Houchins v. KOED. Inc.. 438 U.S. 1, 31 (1978)
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
58Cheh, Cornell Law Review. 710.
59Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. . 417 U.S. 843, 862
(1974) (Powell, J. dissenting).
60Ingber, Duke Law Journal. 5 (quoting Meiklejohn).
61Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. F.C.C.. 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969).
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The first amendment also includes the right of
assembly and of petition. These rights have been broadly
interpreted by the Supreme Court:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble 
for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a 
redress of grievances, or for anything else 
connected with the powers or the duties of the 
national government, is an attribute of national 
citizenship and as such under the protection of 
and guaranteed by the United States. The very 
idea of a government, republican in form, 
implies a right on the part of its citizens to 
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to 
public affairs and to petition...."62
These rights can not be asserted if information about
governmental affairs is lacking.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
The exercise of presidential as well as congressional 
power is limited by the liberty concept of the due process 
clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The due 
process clause directly embodies the fundamental idea that 
government may not exercise coercive power over individuals 
in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner. Based 
on this analysis, a "right to know" is essential since 
secret government is presumptively arbitrary.63
Ninth Amendment 
The clear intent of the founding fathers was that the 
federal government was to be a government of limited,
62U.S. v. Cruikshank. 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876).
63Cheh, Cornell Law Review. 715.
delegated and enumerated powers. All residual powers were 
to be reserved to the states and the people. Further, all 
unenumerated rights were to be retained by the people. The 
ninth amendment clearly implies that the people have rights 
in addition to those specifically enumerated. Hence, the 
lack of a specifically enumerated "right to know" does not 
deny its implicit constitutional recognition.
The constitutional status of the right to know 
remains in controversy. However, there is an explicit 
statutory provision for a conditional right to know which 
is briefly discussed in the following section. Many who 
are opposed to the concept of a constitutionally-based 
right to know support a conditional right to know created 
by legislation rather than by court interpretation.64 
Advocates of this view, state that the legislatures, not 
the courts, should make policy about rights which are not 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. The reason 
for a willingness to accept a politically created right 
while opposing a constitutionally-based right is that 
legislation can be easily amended or repealed when found to 
be unwise or unworkable; whereas, a constitutionally-based 
right can be eliminated, reshaped or contained only with 
great difficulty.65
64Loren P. Beth, "The Public Right to Know: The
Supreme Court as Pandora?" Michigan Law Review 81 (March 
1983): 882-883.
65Ibid.
34
Freedom of Information Act 
The Freedom of Information Act, signed into law in 
1966 as an amendment to section 3 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946, generally establishes the right of 
the public to obtain information from federal agencies. 
This law describes a specific procedure through which 
citizens may obtain access to agency records. In its 
enactment of this provision, Congress sought to "remedy the 
mischief of arbitrary and self-serving withholding by 
agencies which are not directly responsible to the 
people."66 The basic purpose of the Freedom of Information 
Act is to "ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the 
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check 
against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to 
the governed."6 7
The Freedom of Information Act is a three-part 
process designed to provide access to the activities of the 
federal government. The first part of the Act requires 
agencies of the executive branch to publish statements of 
general policy, rules governing their procedures, and a 
description of their central and field organizations.68
66Westinqhouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinaer. 542 F.2d 
1190, 1210 (4th Cir. 1976).
67N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.. 437 U.S. 214, 
242 (1978).
68Freedom of Information Act. U.S. Code, vol. 28, sec. 
552(a)(1) (1986).
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The second part requires agencies to index and make 
available to the public final opinions, unpublished 
statements of policy, and staff directives that affect 
members of the public.69 The third part compels the 
release, on request, of all agency records not covered by 
one of nine exemptions.70 These exemptions have prompted 
the majority of the litigation under the Act, but the focus 
of this paper does not include a discussion of these 
controversies.71
69Ibid., sec. 552 (a) (2).
70Ibid., sec. 552 (a)(3) .
71The following nine categories of documents comprise 
the exemptions of this Act:
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established 
by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact 
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and 
practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other 
than section 552b of this title), provided that such 
statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the 
public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the 
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for 
withholding or refers to particular type of matters to be 
withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information 
obtained from a person and either privileged or 
confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters 
which would not be available by law to a party other than 
an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement 
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of 
such records would (A) interfere with enforcement 
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair 
trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an
The right to know has been discussed in terms of its 
basis in democratic theory and in the legal basis upon 
which it is founded in the federal government of the United 
States. On the state government level all fifty states 
have some legislation relative to the right to know. State 
statutory provisions regularly include open meeting laws 
and right to access laws. However, only Montana has given 
the right to know explicit constitutional status.-^ 
Montana's constitutional provision and its affect on public 
administrators is the primary focus of this paper. The 
following chapter will discuss this provision, its history, 
implementing legislation, and recent litigation.
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the 
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a 
record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in 
the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency 
conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, confidential information furnished only by 
the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative 
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or 
physical safety of law enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or 
condition reports prepared by, on behalf of or for the use 
of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision 
of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, 
including maps, concerning wells. Ibid., sec. 552 (b)(1)- 
(b)(9).
CHAPTER IV 
"RIGHT TO KNOW" IN MONTANA
The Constitution of the State of Montana, ratified in
1972, includes an explicit "right to know" provision.
Montana is unique in this respect.72 Although all fifty
states and the federal government have some form of
statutory provision for freedom of information, only
Montana has given this right explicit constitutional
status. Article II, Section 9, of the Montana
Constitution, reads:
Right to know. No person shall be deprived of 
the right to examine documents or to observe 
the deliberations of all public bodies or 
agencies of State government and its 
subdivisions, except in cases in which the
demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds
the merits of public disclosure.
The framers of the Montana Constitution were intent 
upon protecting individual freedoms and insuring openness
in government. Thus, the only limitation placed on the
right to know is the right of the individual to personal 
privacy. Wade J. Dahood, Chairman of the Bill of Rights
Committee of the Montana Constitutional Convention, in
72 David Gorman, "Rights in Collision: The Individual
Right of Privacy and the Public Right to Know," Montana Law 
Review. 39, no. 2 (Summer, 1978): 249.
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presenting the proposed declaration of rights, urged the 
convention to take note that "the guidelines and 
protections for the exercise of liberty in a free society 
come not from government but from the people who create 
government.1,73 He added that it was in that spirit that 
the committee attempted to insure "a more responsible 
government that is constitutionally commanded never to 
forget that government is created solely for the welfare of 
the people."74
This fundamental right, the "right to know," and its 
effect on public administrators is the primary focus of 
this paper. Compliance with the "right to know" provision 
can present difficulties for the public administrator. 
Service to the people of the state must be carried out in 
an honest, open and forthright manner while preserving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the office as well as 
protecting the individual's right of privacy. The 
remainder of this chapter details legislative 
implementation and recent litigation concerning the right 
to know provision while the following chapter will discuss 
the overall effect of the right to know on public 
administrators.
73Montana Constitutional Convention of 1971-1972.
Vol. II (Helena, Mt.: Montana Legislature 1979): 619.
74 Ibid.
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Legislative Implementation 
There was substantial sentiment within the 
constitutional convention to amend the "right to know" 
provision by deleting the final phrase "except in cases in 
which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the 
merits of public disclosure" and substituting the phrase 
"except as mav be provided by law in cases in which the 
demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of 
public disclosure."7  ̂ The delegates selected the former 
wording which implicitly relies on the courts to interpret 
the general constitutional language in the course of 
resolving individual conflicts on a case by case basis.
The proposed amendment would have directed, or at 
least would have encouraged, the legislature to consider 
and pass legislation to define and direct openness in 
government. In passing such legislation, it would have 
been necessary to consider various positions and to weigh 
and balance the competing interests determining which 
individual privacy interests exceeded the interest of the 
public's right to know. In fact, it is unlikely that the 
statutory pattern that would have evolved under the more 
direct legislative mandate would have been much different
75While the vote was relatively close, 56 to 30, the 
proposed amendment was defeated as the convention delegates 
favored the provision without any direction to the 
legislature that it should implement the provision. 
Montana Constitutional Convention of 1971-1972. Vol. V,
1671-1679.
from the one that now exists. The legislature has felt 
obligated to formulate guidelines and to reevaluate 
existing statutes that restricted the public's right to 
know.
Prior to the constitutional convention, there were a 
large number of statutes that pertained to the public's 
right to know and limitations upon that right.76 
Subsequent to the Convention, the legislature's attempts to 
repeal the statutory provisions which had accumulated in 
the codes, restricting the public's right to know, met with 
only marginal success.77 The 1972 Montana Constitution 
also contains a provision regarding the public's right of 
participation in governmental activities: MThe public has
the right to expect governmental agencies to afford such 
reasonable opportunity for citizen participation in the 
operation of the agencies prior to the final decision as 
may be provided by law."78 The legislature assumed the 
responsibility to delineate the concept of a right of the
76For example, such diverse activities as bean dealer 
records, grade of commercial fertilizer, bank reports, 
insurer notices of noncompliance, hard rock mining 
information, records concerning air contaminant sources, 
information relating to occupational health, water 
pollution information, welfare information records, and 
pre-sentence investigative reports were previously afforded 
some degree of statutory confidentiality.
77See proceedings of the Forty-third Legislative 
Session.
78Constitution of the State of Montana, art. II, sec. 
8 (1972).
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public to participate in the operation of government as
well as a right to know about government.79
The most important statute effecting the right to
know was passed prior to the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention. This law is primarily concerned with the right
to observe the deliberations of governmental bodies and is
known as Montana's Open Meeting Law. It states that:
"The legislature finds and declares that public 
boards, commissions, councils, and other public 
agencies in this state exist to aid in the 
conduct of the peoples' business. It is the
intent of this part that actions and 
deliberations of all public agencies shall be 
conducted openly. The people of the state do 
not wish to abdicate their sovereignty to the 
agencies which serve them. Toward these ends,
79'iThe legislature finds and declares pursuant to the 
mandate of Article II, section 8, of the 1972 Montana
constitution that legislative guidelines should be 
established to secure to the people of Montana their
constitutional right to be afforded reasonable opportunity 
to participate in the operation of governmental agencies 
prior to the final decision of the agency." The key 
provision of this legislation provides that "...each agency 
shall develop procedures for permitting and encouraging the 
public to participate in agency decisions that are of
significant interest to the public. The procedures shall 
assure adequate notice and assist public participation
before a final agency action is taken that is of
significant interest to the public." Of perhaps equal
importance is the provision specifying the exceptions: "(1)
an agency decision that must be made to deal with an
emergency situation affecting the public health, welfare, 
or safety; (2) an agency decision that must be made to 
maintain or protect the interests of the agency, including 
but not limited to the filing of a lawsuit in a court of 
law or becoming a party to an administrative proceeding; or
(3) a decision involving no more than a ministerial act. 
Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 2-3-101 et seq. (1987).
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the provisions of the part shall be liberally 
construed." 80
The principal provision of this legislation which 
both requires open meetings as well as providing certain 
exceptions is MCA 2-3-203, which says:
(1) All meetings of public or governmental 
bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies 
of the state, or any political subdivision of 
the state or organizations or agencies supported 
in whole or in part by public funds or expending 
public funds must be open to the public.
(2) All meetings of associations that are 
composed of public or governmental bodies 
referred to in subsection (1) and that regulate 
the rights, duties, or privileges of any 
individual must be open to the public.
(3) Provided, however, the presiding 
officer of any meeting may close the meeting 
during the time the discussion relates to a 
matter of individual privacy and then if and 
only if the presiding officer determines that 
the demands of individual privacy clearly exceed 
the merits of public disclosure. The right of 
individual privacy may be waived by the 
individual about whom the discussion pertains 
and, in that event, the meeting shall be open.
(4) However, a meeting may be closed to 
discuss a strategy to be followed with respect 
to collective bargaining or litigating position 
of the public agency.
(5) Any committee or subcommittee appointed 
by a public body or an association described in 
subsection (2) for the purpose of conducting 
business which is within the jurisdiction of 
that agency shall be subject to the requirements 
of this section.1'
Additional provisions prohibit excluding accredited 
press representatives from any open meeting81 and require
80MCA 2-3-201 (1987).
81MCA 2-3-211 (1987).
that minutes of meetings shall be open for inspection by 
the public.82
This section was originally enacted in 1963 and was
patterned after the federal Freedom of Information Act. As
originally enacted the section contained additional
exceptions which have been deleted since passage of the
right to know section in the 1972 Montana Constitution.
Other statutes effecting the right to know are
concerned with disclosure or rights to inspect government-
held information. For example, MCA 2-6-102 provides that:
(1) Every citizen has a right to inspect and 
take a copy of any public writings of this 
state, except as...expressly provided by 
statute. (2) Every public officer having the
custody of a public writing which a citizen has 
a right to inspect is bound to give him on 
demand a certified copy of it....
Notwithstanding the relatively strong language of 
Article II, Sections 8 and 9, in the Montana Constitution 
and the reasonably clear language of the open meeting and 
disclosure statutes, there are still many statutory 
provisions restricting the public's general right to know 
or to have access to governmental documents. For example, 
restrictions are placed on records involving various 
municipal activities,82 adoption proceedings,8  ̂ child abuse
82MCA 2-3-212 (1987).
83MCA 7-1-4144 (1987). One subdivision of this chapter 
seems to be an attempt to countermand the express language 
of the constitution. It states that "[e]xcept as provided 
by law and as determined by the chief law enforcement 
administrator, law enforcement records which relate to
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and neglect,85 and Youth Court proceedings.86 In addition, 
dissemination of criminal justice information is 
restricted;87 confidentiality of medical reports and health 
care information is required;88 the required documentation 
of all abortions is confidential;89 confidentiality of 
certain required reports from banks and trust companies is 
mandated;90 and insurance company examination reports 
cannot be revealed.91
matters in which the right to individual privacy or law 
enforcement security exceeds the merits of public 
disclosure shall not be available to the public."
84MCA 40-8-126 (1987).
85MCA 41-3-205 (1987).
86MCA 41-5-601 (1987).
87MCA 44-5-214, 44-5-301, 44-5-302, 44-5-303, 44-5-504 
and 44-5-515 (1987) . There are a number of laws both
permitting and restricting the release of criminal justice 
information and criminal intelligence information. Two 
sections in the chapter on law enforcement emphasize the 
concept of individual privacy but fail to specify the need 
to balance the right of privacy with the public's right to 
know.
88MCA 50-16-203 and 50-16-205 (1987).
89MCA 50-20-110 (5) (1987).
90MCA 32-1-234 (1987).
9^MCA 33-1-412 (1987). The above mentioned statutes
do not purport to be a complete or comprehensive 
explanation or even a complete listing of all relevant 
right to know statutes or exemptions from the provision. A 
thorough listing of all Montana statutes that might involve 
the "citizen's right to know" is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
With the enormous number of statutes which impinge 
upon the right to know, some of which have been mentioned, 
it is surprising that only a few cases have been brought 
before the courts for judicial interpretation. Some of 
these are discussed in the following section.
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Recent Litigation 
Six of the cases which have been brought before the 
state Supreme Court involving the right to know provision 
are discussed in this section. Cases which were not
included were primarily based on court procedures.92 The 
selected cases were chosen because each has an impact on 
public administrators either directly or indirectly. The 
following case discussions include a description of the 
facts and a statement of the court holding. The
difficulties these holdings create for public
administrators will be discussed in Chapters V and VI.
Board of Trustees v. Board of County Commissioners93
The Board of County Commissioners of Yellowstone 
County, after holding public meetings for the purpose of 
hearing testimony regarding a proposed subdivision, closed 
the meeting and reached a final decision on the matter 
during a telephone conference call. (This conversation 
excluded not only the public, but one of the three 
commissioners as well.)
92Great Falls Tribune v. District Court. 608 P.2d 116 
(Mont. 1980), which dealt with the right to know versus the 
right to a fair trial; State v. District Court. 649 P.2d 
982 (Mont. 1982), which addressed the issue as it affected 
pretrial proceedings; and Cox v. Lee Enterprises. 723 P.2d 
238 (Mont. 1986), which dealt with a question regarding the 
availability of a qualified privilege as a defense in a 
defamation case.
93606 P.2d 1069 (Mont. 1980).
The court held that a telephone conference call 
constituted a meeting; and in this instance, a closed 
meeting in violation of Montana's open meeting law94 and 
the right to know provision of the constitution.95 Due to 
this violation, the court held that the proceedings were to 
be nullified.
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Dept, of 
Public Service Regulation96
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company is a 
public utility incorporated in Colorado, offering telephone 
services, and other services in the State of Montana. The 
Public Service Commission regulates public utilities in the 
state. The Montana Consumer Counsel appears at public 
hearings conducted by the Public Service Commission as the 
representative of the consuming public. The telephone 
company filed an application with the commission for a rate 
increase for its regulated services. The consumer counsel 
appeared before the commission in opposition to this 
increase. During the process of deciding on this request,
94MCA 2-3-201 (1987) . It was deemed to be a closed
meeting because the public was excluded not because one 
member of the commission was not included.
95COMMENT: This case is important to the citizen's
right to know since telephone calls between public servants 
could be used to purposefully exclude the public from 
deliberations. This type of "closed meeting" would be 
difficult for the unsuspecting public to discover or prove. 
However, this ruling places an increased and uncertain 
burden on elected officials and public administrators.
96634 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1981).
the commission asked the telephone company to submit 
particular business information to the commission and the 
consumer counsel. The company offered to make this 
information available to the commission and the consumer 
counsel only if the commission would issue a protective 
order preserving the confidentiality of certain trade 
secrets claimed by the telephone company to be a valuable 
property right. The Public Service Commission declined to 
issue the protective order on the grounds that according to 
the constitution and statutory provisions97 the citizens of 
Montana have a right to inspect all documents in the 
possession of the commission with the only exception being 
a protection of individual privacy and that a corporation 
is not entitled to the protection of the individual privacy 
exception under the right to know provision of the state 
constitution.
The court held that "the demands of individual 
privacy of a corporation as well as of a person might 
clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure, and thus 
come within the exception of the right to know 
provision.1,98 The court further held that trade secret 
information was technically private property entitled to 
constitutional protection and that the denial of the
97Constitution of the State of Montana, art. II, sec 
9; MCA 69-3-105 (1987); MCA 2-6-102 (1987).
98634 P.2d 181, 188.
request to issue the protective order had the effect of 
violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the federal constitution and the due process 
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. However, 
the right of privacy is not absolute and can be infringed 
when there is a showing of a compelling state interest. 
Thus, the court decided that forced disclosure of trade 
secret information from a public utility to the commission 
and consumer counsel was not a violation of the company's 
constitutional rights because there was a compelling state 
interest in the regulation of utilities. Therefore, 
Mountain Bell was required to furnish the commission and 
the consumer counsel with all information necessary for 
regulation, but disclosure to the public in general was not 
allowed since this could deprive the telephone company of 
property without due process of law. The Public Service 
Commission was thereby required to issue a protective order 
for all trade secret information deemed confidential."
"COMMENT: The problem raised by this ruling is that
the court seems to ignore the plain language of the 
constitution and the obvious intent of the framers by 
declaring that a corporation is entitled to the protection 
of the individual privacy exception under the right to 
know. In the debates of the 1972 Constitutional Convention 
the delegates clearly intended the right of privacy to be 
reserved for individuals only. Answering a question 
concerning the privacy of a corporation, a member of the 
Bill of Rights committee responded that a corporation would 
not be considered to be an individual. See Constitutional 
Convention. Vol. V, 1680.
In most cases, the public right to know has no 
bearing on corporations. However, publicly regulated 
industries, such as public utilities, are not typical
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Montana Human Rights Division v. Citv of Billings100
The Montana Human Rights Act10 -̂ provides that the 
right to be free from discrimination includes the right to 
obtain and hold employment without discrimination. The 
Human Rights Commission was established as the 
administrative watchdog over discriminatory practices and 
was granted broad investigative powers to allow thorough 
scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding complaints of 
discrimination. Discrimination complaints against the City 
of Billings had been filed with the commission. As a part 
of the commission's investigation of these complaints, 
requests were made by the commission for the city to submit 
personnel files, employee evaluations, disciplinary
corporations. They are state regulated monopolistic 
enterprises which are given special support and are 
expressly controlled by state government. There should be 
no reasonable expectation of privacy by a regulated 
industry regarding information necessary for determining 
the granting of a rate increase. Further, the activities 
of the agencies which are charged with regulating public 
utilities are precisely the activities the citizenry should 
be allowed to observe. The kind of information generated 
by public utility commissions is information which should 
be made available to the public. Too often, commissions 
formed to regulate such industries have become subservient 
to the industry they are supposed to be regulating and too 
often the so-called public representative in the form of a 
consumer counsel becomes subservient to the commission. 
Thus, the necessity for public observation of regulated 
industries and regulating agencies is obvious and should 
not be restricted. See Larry M. Elison, "Right of 
Privacy," Montana Law Review 48, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 1-
52.
100649 P.2d 1283 (Mont. 1982) 
101MCA 49-1-102 (1987).
records, test scores and application materials for 
complainants and certain other employees and applicants for 
employment with the city. The city refused to comply with 
this request, stating that it “would not voluntarily turn 
over to (the commission) the personnel files and test 
scores for the individuals requested other than the 
charging parties without consent of the persons that are 
the subjects of the personnel files unless of course there 
was a court order directing us to do so."102 Responding 
further, the city declared that the information sought by 
the commission was personal and that releasing it without 
prior consent of the individuals involved "may constitute 
an invasion of those persons' privacy and may render the 
City liable for that invasion.1,103
The court held that the information sought is 
protected by Montana's constitutional right of privacy104 
and that the City of Billings could assert constitutional 
rights on behalf of their employees. However, the court 
found that the circumstances of this case present a 
compelling state interest to which the right of individual 
privacy must yield. The court declared that "the scrutiny
102649 P.2d 1283, 1285.
103Ibid.
104Constitution of the State of Montana, art. II, sec. 
10: "Right of Privacy. The right of individual privacy is
essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not 
be infringed without the showing of a compelling state 
interest."
in the present case must involve comparison of employee 
records, applications, evaluations, tests, etc. There is 
simply no other way for (the commission) to determine 
whether the City...discriminated in the ways alleged by 
complainants.1,105 The court also held that the attempt to 
obtain consent from the individuals whose records would be 
released would be prohibitive.
Concluding that it was necessary that the city 
provide the requested information, the court also found it 
necessary to establish some protection of the privacy of 
those individuals whose files were made available to the 
Commission. Again the court declared a need to balance the 
public and private interests, stating, "when the public 
right to know collides with . . . the right to protect 
certain private information, a balancing of rights is 
necessary."106 The court concluded that the city must 
release the "fullest available information" to the 
commission and that the commission upon releasing the 
information to the public must conceal the identity of the 
individuals whose records were a part of the 
investigation.107
105649 P.2d 1283, 1289.
106Ibid. at 1291.
107COMMENT: The court's ruling presents problems for
the public's right to know especially in its ruling on the 
issue of whether a governmental agency can assert 
constitutional rights on behalf of an individual. Since 
this authority could be easily abused, the consequences of
Jarussi v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 28. 
Lake County108
At a meeting with the Board of Trustees of School 
District No. 28, Jarussi, a non-tenured full-time principal 
and teacher, requested an increase in salary for the 
following school year. The Board closed the meeting to 
discuss the request. Jarussi claimed he objected to this 
closure, but his objection was not recorded in the minutes 
of the meeting. The Board re-opened the session and 
offered Jarussi a position for the following year with a 
salary increase that was less than requested. Jarussi 
claimed he accepted the offer, but this acceptance also 
failed to be recorded in the minutes. At a subsequent 
Board meeting, which was again closed, the Board withdrew 
its offer of employment to Jarussi. Jarussi claimed a 
violation of his constitutional right to observe the 
deliberations of the school board under the right to know
this decision could virtually eliminate any access to many 
government-held documents and thereby significantly 
truncate the citizen's right to know. The agency in this 
case, the City of Billings, is the governmental entity 
against whom complaints of discriminatory employment 
practices had been filed. The city might therefore have a 
self-serving interest in concealing the information in 
their employment records while claiming that the city, by 
withholding these files, was asserting the constitutional 
right of privacy on behalf of the individuals whose records 
were requested. Further, there is a question as to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the test which the court 
has applied in previous privacy issues. There can be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding employment 
information about governmental employees. The citizens, as 
actual employer, have a right to this information.
108664 P.2d 316 (Mont. 1983).
provision of the Montana Constitution. The school board 
argued that the closure was proper under a statutory 
provision permitting closure "to discuss a strategy to be 
followed with respect to collective bargaining."109
The court found that the school board's discussion in 
the closed meeting did not constitute "collective 
bargaining"110 and that in closing the meeting, there was 
no determination that the demand of individual privacy 
clearly exceeded the merits of public disclosure since the 
individual whose privacy might have been invaded requested 
the meeting to be open. The court held that the meeting 
was improperly closed, that Jarussi had a right to be 
present at the board's meeting, and that the action taken 
by the board regarding Jarussi was void.
109MCA 2-3-203 (4) (1987).
110The court adopted the definition for "collective 
bargaining" which was used in N.L.R.B. v. Stow
Manufacturing Co. . 217 F.2d 900 (2nd Cir. 1954):
"...Collective bargaining is an activity, presupposing that 
the employees shall have opportunity in absence of their 
employer to canvas their grievances, formulate their 
demands in common, and instruct an advocate who they
believe will best press their suit." COMMENT: Since
collective bargaining sessions are allowed to be closed 
under the exemption to the- open meeting law, it is
important that the court has given a definite meaning to 
the term. This eliminates the possibility of having 
regular meetings closed when a mere discussion of salaries 
is on the agenda. It is important to note that the court 
did not address the question of whether the "collective 
bargaining" exemption was constitutional. It assumed the 
collective bargaining exemption to be constitutional and 
then commenced the task of defining the term.
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Missoulian v. Board of Regents of Higher Education111
The Missoulian brought action against the Board of 
Regents claiming that the board's closure of a job 
performance evaluation meeting concerning presidents of the 
six university system units violated Montana's Open Meeting 
Law and the right to know provision of the state 
constitution.112
In balancing the rights in conflict, the court 
determined that in considering this particular set of facts 
the demands of individual privacy clearly exceed the merits 
of public disclosure. The court held that the closure of 
meetings intended to evaluate the job performance of 
university presidents' was necessary to protect the 
individual privacy of the presidents and other university 
personnel. The court said that there was no public 
interest in disclosing the subject matter of the 
meetings113 and that the effectiveness of the evaluation
111675 P.2d 962 (Mont. 1984).
112MCA 2-3-201 (1987) and Constitution of the State of 
Montana. art. II, sec. 9.
113 COMMENT: The public interest is an important
factor which should have been weighed by the court instead 
of being dismissed as non-existent. The people have a 
right to know the quality of work being performed by 
government employees whose salaries are paid with tax 
dollars. The necessity of the citizen's right to know is 
highlighted in this case. Public employees are just that 
—  public. Information as to their job performance is of 
primary interest to the public and there can be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding performance 
evaluations for public work.
sessions would be destroyed if the meetings were open. 
Thus, the court found no constitutional or statutory 
violation in the closure of the board's job evaluation 
meetings.
Belth v. Bennett114
Belth is an Indiana University professor of economics 
and editor and publisher of "Insurance Forum," a magazine 
which provides information to the public regarding the 
insurance industry. Bennett is the State Auditor and 
Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Montana. Belth 
requested certain information from the office of the 
insurance commissioner. The requested documents, Insurance 
Regulatory Information System (IRIS) reports, are prepared 
and distributed by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) to its members. NAIC is an insurance 
regulator support group whose membership is made up of the 
insurance regulators from the fifty states, the District of 
Columbia and U.S. territories. The reports in question 
contain information regarding the financial solvency of 
over 5000 participating insurance companies and are 
prepared and distributed to insurance commissioners so that 
individual commissioners may take appropriate action 
against an insurer which has been identified as having 
potential financial problems. After initially agreeing to
114740 P.2d 638 (Mont. 1986).
Belth's request, the commissioner ultimately refused to 
release the documents. Belth claimed that the right to 
know provision of the Montana Constitution allowed him 
access to the documents while Insurance Commissioner 
Bennett claimed a right of privacy exception to the right 
to know on behalf of the insurance companies.
The court held that, as in Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
corporations, in this case the insurance companies, could 
assert the privacy exception of the right to know provision 
of the constitution. The court also held that, as in 
Montana Human Rights Division v. City of Billinas, a 
governmental agency can assert the privacy interest of 
another, thus allowing the insurance commissioner to assert 
the privacy interests of the insurance companies since "the 
preliminary and subjective quality (of the IRIS 
reports)... intrudes upon the privacy interest at stake."115 
The court therefore instructed the insurance commissioner 
to withhold information contained in investigative files 
from the public.116
115Ibid. at 643.
116COMMENT: As previously discussed in regards to
public utilities, there should be no reasonable expectation 
of privacy by companies in any regulated industry. 
Information regarding the financial stability of each 
company should be readily available to the public. 
Presumptively, the primary obligation of the insurance 
commissioner is to protect the citizens of the state, not 
the insurance companies who may be in financial difficulty. 
As stated by Justice Hunt in his dissent:
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As has been demonstrated in the case discussions, the 
balancing of the right to know with the right of privacy 
can be a difficult task. This is especially true for 
public administrators being pressured by various 
conflicting interests. The following chapter discusses the 
impact of the right to know on public administrators in 
Montana.
In balancing the right to privacy of a 
relatively sophisticated insurance company doing 
business in Montana with the rights of generally 
less informed consumer-citizens who seek to 
purchase insurance, I would hold that the 
expectation of the citizen to know about the 
company clearly outweighs the need of a state 
agency to warehouse information in secrecy and 
deny citizens the right to be informed. Ibid. 
at 644 (Justice Hunt dissenting).
Allowing regulated industries to convert what should be 
public records into private records erodes the public's 
right to know. If such activities are countenanced by the 
court, "the right to know provision will soon become 
worthless." Ibid, at 646 (Justice Sheehy dissenting).
CHAPTER V
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS AND THE "RIGHT TO KNOW"
Before proceeding to the problem of the public 
administrator's response to the public's right to know, it 
is essential to describe in a general way what it is the 
public may have a right to know. What activities and 
information might be available? What records do agencies 
possess? Are there written or oral agency policies, intra­
office memos, inter-department memos, unpublished rules of 
procedure, known and recorded or unrecorded department 
objectives, i.e., the announced departmental agenda and 
"the hidden agenda?" And further, who are the "persons" to 
which we accord the right to know? Does it also include 
the angry citizen seeking to uncover corruption in 
government, "the Mr. Belth's" who for profit seek to inform 
the general public about the state of the insurance 
industry or about other businesses or governmental 
entities? Does it include the newspaper person seeking to 
tell all, but more interested in scandal and corruption 
than in the regular, ordinary but unspectacular activities 
of the conscientious public servant? Certainly, these 
people are included in the term "person." It includes each 
and every citizen since the constitutional provision says
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that 'Tnlo person shall be deprived. Therefore, the
purpose for requesting the information has no bearing on 
whether a request for information should be granted. The 
following section discusses the types of information which 
are collected by governmental bodies and the collection and 
storage methods used in handling this material.
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Information
What information is collected and by whom? Every 
imaginable kind of information is collected by government 
and most of it by administrative agencies. Agencies, 
commissions, boards and elected officials are either 
directed or authorized to collect and maintain information 
from many sources and about a variety of subjects; for 
example, tax records, medical records, business records, 
criminal records, and welfare records. This information is 
collected and stored by the Department of Revenue, the 
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, the State 
Auditor, the State Insurance Commissioner, the Department 
of Social and Rehabilitative Services, and the Justice 
Department. This listing of the agencies, boards and 
commissions and the kinds of information collected barely 
scratches the surface but is at least indicative. The 
quantity of the information collected and held by state 
agencies is enormous.
How is it collected? Some of the information is 
demanded by state law, for example, income tax returns 
which reveal a great deal about the financial activities of 
the people of this state. Some of the information is 
requested in the process of regulating businesses, for 
example, information submitted to the Public Service 
Commission by public utilities or the information submitted 
by insurance companies that desire to do business in the
state which must be submitted to the insurance 
commissioner. Some information comes from the medical 
profession in seeking reimbursement for medical services or 
in the reporting of abortions performed. Some is obtained 
in the course of investigations by the criminal justice 
department and may require the use of search warrants. 
Some may be the result of investigations by the health 
department relying on administrative search warrants. Some 
may be volunteered by surveys. Some may be the result of a 
variety of citizen contacts with government agencies as 
consultants, employees, clients, inmates and agency 
opponents.
The information may be collected on bits of paper or 
on computer disks. It may be stored in paper files or in 
computer banks. It may be stored as collected or it may be 
analyzed, classified and computerized before storage. As a 
result of the methods of collection, analysis, and storage, 
it may become completely accessible or virtually 
inaccessible. It may be accessed to obtain statistical 
data, to inform the legislature, to advise the public or to 
prosecute a criminal. It may be analyzed in a fashion that 
builds in a bias or analyzed and compared in a manner that 
makes it immediately useful in a practical, problem-solving 
sense or as a powerful political tool. Regardless of what 
and by whom it has been collected or the methods used,
possession of information has become a powerful tool in the 
daily operation of governmental agencies or departments.
Governments have always been driven by information. 
The phenomenal increase in the information available to 
governments because of computer technology has created new 
problems and exacerbated old ones relating to the use and 
access of information. Information is a critical resource 
in modern democratic politics and the ascendancy of the 
bureaucracy in contemporary political life is plainly 
traceable to superior informational capabilities. The 
enhancement of information gathering, storing and accessing 
capabilities leads not only to an increased quantity of 
data but also to an increased potential for information 
manipulation and nondisclosure as well as an increase in 
the potential infringement of individual privacy. Thus, 
citizens have become ever more concerned about the 
information which the government obtains and distributes. 
The following section discusses this distribution of 
information and the motives for disclosing and withholding.
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Disclosure of Information 
There are various reasons for which public 
administrators distribute information to the public as well 
as reasons information is withheld. Whereas the
constitution's right to know provision does not require 
agencies to disseminate government-held information, it 
does require that this material be made available to the 
public. Although the primary concern of this paper is not 
about information distribution initiated by the agency, 
this is an important dimension of the right to know. Three 
reasons public administrators distribute information will 
be examined. General distribution of information may be 
made because of legal demands, because of personal or 
political interests, or because of the administrator's 
concern for the public's well-being.
First, some information is distributed because the 
law commands that it shall be distributed. For example, 
Montana's Administrative Procedure Act117 requires that 
public notice be published prior to any adoption or change 
of rules or procedures; the declaratory rulings of any 
board, agency or department which is not subject to the 
Montana Administrative Procedure Act are required to be 
published;118 and records of many local government 
proceedings and rulings of local governments such as
117MCA 2-4-101 et. seq.
118MCA 2-3-113.
proposed zoning regulations119 are required by law to be 
published.
Second, information may be disseminated for personal 
or political reasons to enhance or advance the individual 
administrator's position or to discredit opposing factions. 
For example, the large number of abortions reported during 
a given year may be used to support the "Right To Life" 
movement and to discourage the legislature from providing 
abortion-related medical benefits for welfare recipients. 
The careful and selective development of information 
indicating the continuing need for the particular agency's 
services may be an important leverage to obtain more
funding for the agency. The release of scandalous 
information or information about criminal conduct or secret 
activity may be used to embarrass a department or certain 
persons in a department or it may be used against other 
agencies. Although the release of such information may 
have an altruistic motivation, i.e., "the public ought to 
know," it may be purely vindictive and self-serving. 
Nevertheless, it does result in the distribution of
information to the public about governmental activity.
While there is a common tendency to identify public 
administrators as the chief source of secrecy in
government, it should be noted that recent American
experience suggests that bureaucracy can be a source of
119MCA 76-2-205.
information that political leaders wish to conceal. For 
example, it apparently was public administrators who 
provided the first information about both the Watergate 
scandal and the Iran-Contra affair. In Montana, the 
Legislative Auditor regularly strikes fear in the heart of 
administrators as departments are investigated and 
evaluated and the resulting critique and recommendations 
are publicly reported.
Third, the public administrator may hold an 
altruistic view of concern for the needs of a healthy 
democracy, that is, a simple belief that the public should 
know what its government is doing. This is most likely to 
trigger the release and publication of information of a 
non-controversial nature; for example, the threat to public 
safety due to the escape of a dangerous felon, health 
hazards from a contaminated public water supply, and the 
amount of money contributed to state government by income 
taxpayers or property taxpayers. The per capita
expenditures for state education or the salaries of top 
state officials might be similarly considered. However, 
even these less controversial facts may be released solely 
as criticism, directing public attention to the 
ineffectiveness of law enforcement, or the carelessness of 
the water company. It may be an effort to reduce taxes or 
increase salaries. But it might simply be the response of
responsible public servants who honestly believe in the 
public's right to know.
It is, however, most unlikely that even these 
conscientious, committed and altruistic public servants 
would publish intra-office memos or describe general 
departmental policy objectives unless there were some 
strong additional motivation. Dissemination of this type 
of information would be both expensive and not apparently 
useful to the general public.
Notwithstanding these reasons for the public 
administrator's dissemination of material to the public, 
there seem to be even stronger motives to withhold 
information. Several of the reasons for the nondisclosure 
of information will be explored next.
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Nondisclosure of Information 
One of the most widely supported and often used 
justifications for withholding information as to government 
operation is "national security.” However, this is 
generally not a concern of state government. State 
security is rarely, if ever, a legitimate concern 
justifying the withholding of information from the public 
at large. It is imaginable that a criminal terrorist 
activity being investigated by law enforcement within the 
state might justify or at least be claimed to justify 
withholding information from the public.
A second reason for withholding information is to 
protect the financial stability of businesses operating in 
the state. Business stability seemed to be the underlying 
justification for the refusal to release information about 
the insurance industry in the Belth case.120 While there 
may be a persuasive argument supporting this conclusion, 
protection of the consumers' need to know the facts about 
the purchase of a product marketed in the state should take 
precedence over the protection of business corporations.121
120740 P.2d 638.
121COMMENT:It should also be noted that the court in 
the Belth case predicated its decision upholding 
nondisclosure on "corporate privacy” which is not a part of 
the privacy exception of the right to know provision of the 
constitution except by the most unfortunate straining of 
the clear language and a complete disregard for the intent 
of the framers as previously discussed. The right of the 
consumer citizen to product information is particularly 
important when the purchase is insurance which is supposed
Another justification for withholding information 
from the public is based on a lack of trust in the public. 
Many public administrators are honestly convinced that 
their expertise will produce a decision superior to the 
decision that may be forced by the general public if the 
public knows the facts and becomes involved in the 
decision-making process. In Board of Trustees v. Countv 
Commissioners.122 for example, the county commissioners may 
have been advised by administrators as to the "best" course 
of action pertaining to the proposed subdivision; that the 
public would interfere with this decision if they were 
informed about the meeting; and therefore, it was in 
everyone's best interest that the public be excluded.
Regardless of the stated justification for 
nondisclosure, often agency errors or failures of agency 
policy, real or perceived, are the true motivation for 
withholding information from the public. Requested 
information may indicate inefficiency, ineffectiveness,
to be a closely regulated industry. The individual 
consumer, even the most sophisticated, is likely to be 
unable to evaluate insurance companies except to compare in 
a most general way the costs and coverages. The insurance 
commissioner is obligated to evaluate the financial 
stability of the companies selling insurance in the state 
and should make all information available to the consuming 
public before a company is so deeply in trouble that it is 
difficult if not impossible for it to recover. The recent 
bankruptcies of Glacier General and Montana Life are 
excellent examples. In these cases, no information was 
released by the insurance commissioner to protect the 
consumer but every effort was made to save the companies.
122606 P.2d 1069.
perverse policies or personal mistakes. When these are the 
true reasons for nondisclosure, there can be no 
justification. Obviously, however, these reasons will be 
vigorously denied and energetically covered up. The 
release of this information destroys job security, may 
generate a political disaster, may result in decreased 
agency funding and elimination of positions, and may 
subject some individual public administrators to civil or 
criminal sanctions.
According to the state constitution, the only 
justifiable reason for withholding information from the 
public in Montana is the demand of "individual privacy." 
The problem of invasion of individual privacy has two
dimensions. First is the collection and accumulation of 
information, e.g., tax records, medical records, welfare
files, business records, and criminal files and dossiers, 
and second is the disclosure of information previously 
obtained and in the agency's possession. It is possible to 
violate individual privacy in collecting, accumulating, or 
disclosing information.
Collection and accumulation of data may be ordered by 
statute or by an administrative decision based on rules and 
regulations. It is assumed that having the information is 
necessary if the agency is to function effectively and
efficiently. The information may have been obtained by 
request or by demand. It may have required an
administrative search warrant; or it may have been obtained 
after a full search and seizure. Some of the particular 
details of the information obtained from or about 
individual citizens may constitute an invasion of privacy. 
In addition, the particular method used to obtain this 
material may infringe upon an individual's privacy as would 
public disclosure of personal information.
The guidelines directing the public administrator's 
hand in making the sometimes difficult decision to release 
or withhold information are slowly being developed by the 
courts123 and the legislature.124 Since these guidelines 
are seldom generated until there is a problem, this process 
will never be complete. In any event, it is too slow to 
meet the administrator's needs who must deal with the 
problem in a variety of settings and on a daily basis.
It should be noted that the privacy right being 
discussed is not the privacy right of the public 
administrator. By being in government and an agent of the 
people, the public administrator has largely forfeited the 
right to privacy while functioning within the scope of 
public employment. What is done as a public employee is of 
interest to the public and should be available to public 
scrutiny. The privacy right of importance is that of the
123See cases in Chapter IV; Mountain States. Montana 
Human Rights, and Belth in particular.
124For example, see MCA 69-3-105.
individual citizen who has been forced to reveal certain 
personal and often private information that is now in the 
possession of the public administrator. Insofar as the 
public administrator as a member of the general public was 
also forced to reveal such information about private life, 
that information, unassociated with the role of public 
administrator, may be protected on the same grounds and to 
the same extent as any other member of the public.
With the foregoing discussion in mind, this chapter 
concludes with an examination of the general role of the 
public administrator as affected by the right to know. The 
public's right to know will most frequently be tested when 
a request is made by a member of the public for information 
and that request is denied. When the public administrator 
is called upon to disclose government-held information, 
many questions arise and little functional advice is 
available.
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The Public Administrator's Role
Public administrators in Montana are placed in a most 
difficult position being charged with the obligation to 
represent the public while carrying out the daily operation 
of the government according to the directions of the 
executive and the legislature. They are expected to be 
efficient, responsive to public demands, open to the public 
and protective of individual privacy. They are obligated 
to heed all constitutional mandates, follow the commands of 
the legislature as outlined in the statutes, and be 
responsive to the policies of executive leadership.
The right of the public to access government-held 
information can often complicate the already precarious 
position of the public servant. Under Montana's
constitution, the basic obligation of the administrator in 
complying with the right to know provision is to maintain 
complete openness relative to agency operations, agency 
records and agency deliberations unless there is a 
substantial likelihood that someone's individual privacy 
will be infringed. Thus, the public administrator's 
position is one of gatherer, keeper, and disburser or 
withholder of enormous amounts of information. This means 
that the public administrator knows what information is 
being collected, knows how it is being collected and 
stored, knows how accessible it is and makes the initial 
decision as to disclosure or concealment of this
information. Often, this decision may be more casual than 
conscious; more a consequence of traditional operating 
procedure than the result of thoughtful decision-making.
The primary weakness of this process, however, 
derives from the necessity of requiring the executive 
branch to enforce the public's right to know against 
itself. As previously discussed, governmental interests 
are generally concerned with concealment of information, 
and administrative loopholes created by the legislature 
frequently allow bureaucrats to maintain their aura of 
governmental inviolability and shield both incompetence and 
corruption.
The individual act of withholding information from 
the public is frequently based on fear, uncertainty, and 
the lack of the time or background sufficient to explore 
the actual situation and its implications. There may be a 
fear of discovery of a personal mistake or misconduct or 
the fear that superiors may view the disclosure itself to 
be unwise, disloyal, or both. Since many of the concepts 
involved with the right to know and its judicial 
interpretation have not been given clear and concise 
definitions and since there are no guidelines to follow, 
the public administrator is left with uncertainties and 
finds it easier to take no action for fear of making the 
wrong decision. Thus, withholding information is often 
safer for the public administrator than full disclosure.
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Nevertheless, public servants have not only a legal
obligation to enforce the public's right to know against
themselves, but also have a substantial ethical obligation
to protect the public interest. Notwithstanding the
pressures from various interests, the public administrator
must make decisions in a manner which is responsible and
accountable to the public. According to Montana
Constitutional Convention Delegate Wilson:
Government needs to be more to its constituents 
than efficient and economical. It needs to be 
responsive and responsible to the people it 
represents. Its responsibilities include not 
only the matter of protecting the public trust, 
it includes having the trust of the public. 
Public trust does not come from just a matter of 
confidence in the integrity of public officers, 
but rather it comes from knowing that public 
affairs are placed in the public eye. This can 
only occur when the activities of government are 
visible and when there are ways of checking on 
what our public officials are doing....This 
concern should be included in our proposed 
Constitution in such a way that we give the 
public the best chance to view critically its 
public officers, and to avoid open invitation to 
corruption.125
Accountability of public servants is essential to the 
moral empowerment of a society. Moral empowerment provides 
a sense of self determination, the basis of democracy. 
Public administrators must be cautioned against allowing 
the "ends,11 whether they be governmental or self interest, 
to justify the "means," i.e., the withholding of 
information from the public. If this Machiavellian
125Montana Constitutional Convention of 1971-1972. 
Vol. IV, 845.
attitude is allowed to permeate governmental bureaucracy, 
it will lead to the diminution of democracy.
Accepting this ethical responsibility and the 
constitutional mandate to make all information available to 
the public except that which would infringe upon individual 
privacy, how is the public administrator to make practical 
daily decisions regarding the right to know? The following 
chapter concludes this paper with a summary of the major 
points which have been discussed and a brief outline of 
functional considerations for public administrators when 
faced with the conflicts raised by the public's right to 
know.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The vastness of government and its myriad of agencies 
makes it difficult for the electorate to obtain that 
'•popular information" of which Madison spoke. But it is 
only when one further considers the hundreds of 
departments, branches, and agencies which are managed and 
staffed by government employees who have not been elected 
and cannot therefore be held directly accountable by the 
people, that one begins to understand the great importance 
of having an information policy of full disclosure.
Moreover, there is a natural tendency for secrecy to 
spread once it is legitimized in any area since government 
officials have strong incentives for withholding 
information from the public. Secrecy not only affords an 
opportunity to cover up mistakes or to conceal misbehavior, 
it also allows officials to shape policy as they choose 
without having to consult outside groups. Besides allowing 
government officials to escape accountability for their 
actions, secrecy threatens the rationality of government 
decisions. Some of those excluded from the deliberative 
process by practices of secrecy may have information or
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advice to give that could save policy makers from grievous 
errors in judgment.
From the standpoint of the principles of democracy, 
there can be little question that open government should be 
the general rule and few exceptions should be made. In 
considering the specifics of administrative "right to know" 
guidelines for advising public administrators, the 
following problems arise:
(1) In Montana, the only exception to openness is 
confidentiality to protect individual privacy,126 and 
this is allowed only if the privacy interest "clearly 
exceeds the merits of public disclosure." This 
requires the balancing of two very broad concepts, 
privacy and the right to know, neither of which is 
adequately defined. The merits of particular 
controversies over information availability are often 
difficult to assess. Frequently, they arise from 
different values and conflicting interests and from 
the lack of specificity in defining concepts.
(2) There are a plethora of statutes which address 
government secrecy and the public right to know. 
This legislation is erratic and incomplete. It was 
not passed at one time to effectuate a thoughtful
12 6COMMENT: According to court interpretations,
"individual privacy" includes corporate trade secrets and 
insurance company information held by the insurance 
commissioner in investigative files.
master design; much of it was written and lobbied by 
special interest groups without close public 
scrutiny; and some of it predates the 1972 Montana 
Constitution.
(3) Administrators have been prone to deal with 
"right to know" problems only when conflicts arise 
and not before. In other words, there are few agency 
rules and regulations which address the public's 
right to know. It is doubtful that most agencies 
have even considered "right to know" problems except 
in the context of a pending law suit.
(4) The extent and variety of information that is 
collected makes it difficult to classify logically 
and consistently which material might constitute an 
invasion of individual privacy if disclosed and which 
material must be made available to the public.
(5) The state supreme court's interpretations of the 
constitutional right to know provision, which appear 
to ignore both the clear language of the constitution 
as well as the intent of the framers, have increased 
the difficulties for public administrators in making 
decisions involving this right. For example, the 
court's holdings have left the public administrator 
with uncertainty as to the meaning of "individual 
privacy."
In attempting to accommodate in rules and regulations 
all of the above considerations, serious conflicts are 
certain to arise and decisions, once made and acted upon, 
will most certainly be challenged. The question then is 
how can the public administrator best deal with the "right 
to know" provision after the legislature has created an 
inconsistent package of laws in its attempt to implement 
the constitutional provision and when the court has 
infrequently and inconsistently interpreted the provision. 
It is essential that agency personnel have clear guidelines 
for functioning in compliance with Montana's right to know. 
It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, 
but it is not an impossible one either. It is not 
necessary to conclude that to protect one of the interests, 
the other interest must, of necessity, either be abrogated 
or substantially subordinated. The goal is to provide a 
workable formula which protects all interests, yet places 
emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure. The 
following section details specific administrative 
guidelines to implement the right to know in keeping with 
the current statutory provisions and court interpretations.
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Recommended Guidelines 
The following charts outline the guiding principles 
by which the public administrator should make decisions and 
the decisional steps which should be taken prior to 
responding to a request for information. The charts are 
followed by a substantive discussion including illustrative 
examples. The procedural suggestions and substantive 
conclusions are based on logical extensions and 
interpretations derived from generally accepted definitions 
of the "right to know" and "privacy." In other words, they 
are based on the plain meaning of the state constitution. 
These suggestions and conclusions are supported, to the 
extent possible, by statutes, court rulings and attorney 
general opinions.
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"RIGHT TO KNOW" ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Ethical Guidelines
Public administrators must:
1. Maintain a conscious awareness of the fact that
their overall purpose is to serve the public;
2. Recognize that the public is their true employer;
3. Treat each citizen with dignity and respect;
4. Be honest, open and fair in performance of all
duties; and
5. Maintain primary loyalty to the public and secondary
loyalty to elected officials and supervisors.
Practical and Legal Guidelines
Public administrators in balancing the right to know 
with the right of privacy must:
1. Maintain an open meeting policy, except when the
discussion relates to:
a. Personnel matters unless the individual being
discussed waives the right, or
b. Strategy to be followed regarding collective
bargaining or litigating position of an agency;
2. Make available to the public without exception:
a. The kinds of information being collected,
b. Why it is being collected,
c. How it is being collected, stored, and accessed,
d. For what purpose it is being used, and
e. To whom it is being disseminated.
3. Disclose information which:
a. Is statistical in nature and does not identify
an individual;
b. Relates to an agency's operations;
c. Relates to an agency's procedures; or
d. Relates to agency policy.
4. Not disclose information which:
a. Reveals facts about an identifiable individual
including the following:
1) age, sex, or race,
2) medical or health records,
3) personal financial data,
4) work records, or
5) criminal records;
b. Reveals trade secrets belonging to an
individual or a corporation; or
c. Is investigative in nature and
1) concerns a regulated private industry, or
2) identifies individual criminal suspects
or criminal informants.
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"RIGHT TO KNOW" ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECISIONAL STEPS
Is there a 
statutory provision 
for the 
right to know?
yes no
Is the statute 
constitutional?
Is there a possible 
violation of a 
privacy interest?
no yes
Decisions to 
consider:
1)Disclose
2)Deny 
Disclosure
3)Inform 
Legislature
4)Challenge 
Law
Disclose 
information 
if statute 
demands, or 
Deny disclosure 
if statute 
provides for 
exception to 
right to know.
no
Disclose 
Information
yes
Balance 
Rights - 
Does 
privacy 
interest 
outweigh 
disclosure 
interest?
yes no
Deny Disclosure Disclose
Information
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Discussion of Guiding Principles 
The ethical guidelines will be discussed at the end 
of this chapter. Before the practical and legal guidelines 
can be effective in aiding public administrators, their 
concepts and terms should be defined. Since the courts and 
the legislature have not done this, only broad and 
sometimes conflicting interpretations are available to the 
public administrator. The following definitions rely on 
generally accepted meanings of the terms. The "right to 
know" means that government and its agencies and agents can 
not refuse to allow the public access to any government- 
held information or to observe the deliberations of these‘X
'x
bodies. The only explicit exception to the right to know 
is "a case in which the demand for individual privacy 
clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure." 
"Privacy" means protection from unreasonable governmental 
intrusions upon or disclosures about one's person, places 
or things. "Individual privacy" means the privacy of a 
singular human being. The clear intent of the framers was 
to make an exception for individuals only;127 however, the 
court stated in Mountain States that this exception could 
include the demands of individual privacy of a corporation 
when the information contained trade secrets128 and in
127Montana Constitutional Convention of 1971-1972.
Vol. V, 1680.
128634 P.2d 181, 188.
Belth. that the privacy interests of an insurance company 
could exceed the merits of public disclosure when the 
information was investigative in nature.129
The following discussion of the practical and legal 
guidelines includes examples which are found in the 
statutes, court rulings or attorney general opinions. In 
maintaining a policy of openness in deliberations, all 
meetings must remain open to the public except in cases 
where an individual's privacy must be protected. The 
court's ruling in Missoulian allows the closing of job 
evaluation meetings130 to protect the employee's (the 
university presidents) right of privacy. However, job 
evaluation meetings are to remain open if the individual 
whose privacy may be violated requests it.131 In Great 
Falls Tribune the court held that court hearings may be 
closed if there is a risk of jeopardizing a fair trial.132 
According to statute, a meeting may be closed to discuss a 
collective bargaining strategy or a litigation position of 
a public agency; however, in Jarussi the court decided that 
discussions regarding employee salaries does not 
necessarily constitute a collective bargaining strategy
129740 P.2d 638, 643.
130Missoulian v. Board of Regents. 675 P.2d 962.
131Jarussi v. Board of Trustees. 664 P.2d 316.
132Great Falls Tribune v. District Court. 608 P.2d 116.
session.133 Public administrators should keep in mind that 
according to the court's ruling in Board of Trustees v. 
County Commissioners that telephone calls constitute a 
meeting and should not be used to discuss official matters.
The right to know provision demands a policy of full 
disclosure of government-held information with the only 
exception being confidentiality to protect individual 
privacy. However, disclosure of matters of a personal 
nature may be required when the public interest in the 
right to know outweighs the public interest in individual 
privacy. For example, according to an attorney general
r'
opinion, certain information about state employees (title, 
dates and duration of employment, and salary) is of 
sufficient public interest to outweigh the individual 
employee's right of privacy.134 According to statute, 
details such as age, sex, or race must not be disclosed if 
the employee is identifiable;135 however, statistical 
information compiled on age, sex, and race must be made 
available to the general public.136 (For other statutory
133MCA 2-3-203 (4): "However, a meeting may be closed
to discuss a strategy to be followed with respect to 
collective bargaining or litigating position of the public 
agency." See discussion of Jarussi v. Board of Trustees. 
664 P.2d 316, in Chapter IV of this paper.
13438 A.G.Op . 109 (1980).
135Such information may be released by court order 
with protective limits. See Montana Human Rights Division 
v. City of Billings. 649 P.2d 1283.
136MCA 49-2-102 (1987).
provisions authorizing the withholding of information, see 
Chapter IV of this paper where they are discussed in 
detail.) Further examples of the balancing of these two 
rights are considered in the following discussion of the 
decisional steps involving the right to know.
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Discussion of Decisional Steps
The first question to consider when faced with a 
request for government-held information is whether there is 
an explicit statutory provision which affects the requested 
material and the public's right to know. If such a 
provision exists, it should be examined as to its 
constitutionality. If the statute demands the release of 
information and the material is obviously not of a personal 
nature; i.e., does not include, for example, personally 
identifiable facts regarding age, sex, race, financial or 
health records; then it should be released. If the statute 
requires that information should be withheld because of the 
clearly personal nature of the material, the information 
should not be disclosed. Each of these cases would be in 
conformity with the constitutional provision for the right 
to know.
If, however, it appears that the statute is 
unconstitutional, i.e., the material is not of a personal 
nature and the statute authorizes withholding it, the 
public administrator should seek legal advice from the 
agency attorney and possibly the attorney general. The 
public administrator is then faced with several alternative 
courses of action which are not necessarily exclusive: to
release the information risking possible criminal 
prosecution due to the failure to adhere to the laws of the 
state; to deny disclosure of information and be challenged
in court by the person seeking the information; to inform 
the legislature and urge that the statute be repealed; to 
challenge the constitutionality of the law by declaratory 
judgment action.137 Foremost in the public administrator's 
mind in making a decision at this juncture must be a 
consideration of the public's interest. Public
administrators should remember that the public has an 
interest in the protection of individual privacy as well as 
in the right to know.
The Mountain States case is an example of the 
aforementioned process. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company asked the Public Service Commission to 
issue a protective order to prohibit public disclosure of 
certain information which the company claimed contained 
trade secrets. The commission refused to withhold this 
information from the public, basing its refusal on the 
right to know constitutional provision and on a statute 
which demanded that all commission-held material had to 
remain open to the public. The telephone company 
challenged this decision in court. The court ruled in 
favor of protecting trade secret information from public 
disclosure, thus forcing the legislature to amend the 
statute to provide for this exception.138
137MCA 27-8-101.
138MCA 69-3-105: 11 (1) Except as provided in
subsection (2), the reports, records, accounts, files, 
papers, and memoranda of every nature in the possession of
If, on the other hand, there is no such statutory 
provision which applies to the requested material, then the 
public administrator must determine whether there is a 
possible infringement of an individual's right of privacy. 
If there is no individual privacy consideration, i.e., the 
requested material does not contain personal facts 
regarding an identifiable individual, then the information 
should be disclosed. If, however, there is a privacy 
interest to be considered, then the two rights must be 
weighed. If the demand of individual privacy clearly 
exceeds the merits of public disclosure, the information 
should not be released. In Missoulian. for example, the 
individual privacy interest of the university presidents 
was deemed by the court to outweigh the public's need to 
know about the specific details of the job performances 
being discussion.
If, however, the public's right to know outweighs the 
privacy interest, then disclosure of the information is the 
appropriate action. In Board of Trustees v. County 
Commissioners. for example, the court said that the
the commission are open to the public at reasonable times, 
subject to the exception that when the commission considers 
it necessary, it the interest of the public, it may 
withhold from the public any facts or information is its 
possession for a period of not more than 90 days after the 
acquisition of the facts or information.
(2) The commission may issue a protective order when 
necessary to preserve trade secrets, as defined in 30-14- 
402, required to carry out its regulatory functions." 
Compiler's Comment: "1987 Amendment: At beginning of (l)
inserted exception clause; and inserted (2)."
public's interest in the availability of information 
outweighs the public official's privacy interest in 
maintaining secrecy regarding official duties.139 In 
Jarussi the school board was not allowed to protect the 
privacy interest of an individual who wished to waive this 
privacy right.140 And in Montana Human Rights the public's 
interest outweighed the individual's privacy interest 
insofar as the personal information was required to be 
released to the Human Rights Commission; but, dissemination 
of this information to the general public was limited to 
statistics which did not identify specific individuals.141
139Board of Trustees v. Board of County Commissioners. 
606 P.2d 1069.
140664 P.2d 316.
141Montana Human Rights Division v. City of Billings.
649 P.2d 1283.
The Ethical Public Administrator
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According to the constitution, there is to be an 
overall general policy of openness followed by all 
governmental agencies of the state. It is the
responsibility of the individual public administrator to 
promote this policy of open government in every aspect of 
official business. Open government is the ethical 
obligation of each government employee to the public not 
merely an agency obligation. Every public administrator 
should maintain a sense of personal responsibility and 
accountability to the public. Individual responsibility 
should not be shielded by illegal or unethical "agency" 
determinations nor should it be shifted to other persons or 
agencies.^42
The ethical public administrator must first and 
foremost be competent and knowledgeble. Competency and 
knowledge regarding all aspects of the effect of the "right 
to know" on one's agency and its particular information is 
a part of the public administrator's ethical obligation to 
the public. It is essential to be familiar with the 
constitution, the statutes and the cases affecting one's 
particular work and be prepared to deal with problems
142CommENT: The shift of responsibility to the
judicial system could be used as an easy way for agencies 
to avoid making decisions regarding the right to know. 
This manner of dealing with requests for information is not 
only unethical, it is inefficient, time consuming and 
costly.
before they arise. The public administrator should 
encourage creation of agency rules and regulations to aide 
agency personnel in functioning under the "right to know."
The public administrator should not try to avoid or 
circumvent the law to make particular decisions less 
difficult, but should work to make the "right to know" 
concept function better by creating a workable formula 
directed toward protecting all interests. The ethical 
public administrator must give voice to the democratic 
values upon which the right to know is based even though 
this may place the agency in conflict with the court. 
Recognizing the inconsistencies and errors of the courts 
intrepretations, the public administrator may be able to 
encourage the court to define more narrowly the occasions 
where the withholding of information from the public is 
allowed. Until this occurs, the court opinions extending 
the exceptions to the right to know should be read as 
narrowly as possible.
The ethical public administrator should be helpful 
and caring but not controlling. It is not the public 
administrator's responsibility to protect the privacy 
interest of an individual who does not request or want 
protection. For example, a meeting should never be closed
to protect the privacy of an individual who desires to have 
the meeting open.143
Finally, the ethical public administrator must serve 
the public. This does not diminish the value of loyalty to 
one's superior or to the agency. It does not require or 
even suggest the paternalistic protection of the public 
from itself. It does mean adherence to not only the law 
and the constitution but to the spirit of the democratic 
values upon which they are predicated.
143COMMENT: Too often the announced justification is
merely subtrefuge.
Conclusion
There is obviously a need for each agency of state 
government to consider "right to know" issues prior to 
problems arising. Particular decisions of individual 
public administrators could be made easier if each agency 
had a set of rules and regulations directly addressing all 
agency-related statutes and agency-specific information.144 
There is also a need for the creation of an "ombudsman" 
position to whom public administrators could direct 
questions and on whom the public could rely for continuing 
supervision of agency activity and to whom the public could 
direct complaints relative to the right to know. These 
adjustments are beyond the scope of the public 
administrator's authority except as by way of suggestions 
to the elected officials.
144It would be a valuable contribution to public 
administrators as well as to the public in general for the 
state to commission someone to obtain from each agency of 
state government, lists of the following information: (1)
All the information the agency gathers, stores, analyzes, 
and disseminates; (2) Reasons for the accumulation or
dissemination; (3) Methods of obtaining information; (4)
Information storage techniques; (5) Methods of accessing 
information; (6) To whom it is distributed or who has 
access to the information; and (7) Authority, if any, which 
justifies the accumulation, or dissemination of the 
information, including statutes, rules, regulations and
court decisions. Once these facts are accumulated each
statute, rule, regulation and court decision should be 
evaluated. Recommendations for repealing unconstitutional 
statutes, modifying questionable statutes and enacting 
needed statutes could then be made. Finally, a complete 
set of procedural guidelines for each department could then 
be developed and promulgated.
Few would deny that, at least in principle, the 
authority of the American State lies with a sovereign 
citizenry. Yet working against this premise are pleas for 
elite authority based upon claims of expertise, privilege, 
power, or national security. All too often, these are the 
despoilers of open government policies. To the extent that 
they are successful in justifying secrecy, they are 
undermining democratic practice as well. Sensitivity to 
the public's right to know must be heightened and public 
administrators must be resolute in honestly seeking to 
maintain openness in government. Failing this, democracy 
will not vanish, but it will be diminished as governmental 
duplicity and secrecy generate public anxiety, distrust and 
cynicism.
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